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I 
INTRODUCTION 
As is true of any other practice that involves the application of rules by 
human beings, sentencing practices are suffused with the exercise of discretion.1 
In light of a range of permanent conditions that shape the setting in which 
sentencing decisions are being made—including, the indeterminacy of legal 
rules, differences of opinion regarding the aims of punishment, and uncertainty 
regarding the particular offender’s prospects of reoffending—it is clear that 
sentencing laws cannot totally control the way in which judges, prosecutors, and 
juries exercise their discretionary powers. Nevertheless, there is considerable 
support for the view that some forms of legal regulation of sentencing practices 
may be effective in reducing unwarranted disparities and in reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Different legal systems employ 
different mechanisms, including mandatory penalties, system-wide sentencing 
guidelines, and different forms of judicial review of sentencing decisions, in an 
attempt to achieve these goals. 
This article seeks to contribute to our understanding of the political and 
institutional factors shaping cross-national differences in the regulation of 
sentencing discretion. In particular, the article focuses on an important pattern 
that clearly emerges when we adopt a comparative perspective to examine 
current trends in sentencing law, namely, the exceptionally extensive use of 
determinate sentencing laws in the American legal system in comparison with 
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 1.  “Sentencing discretion” exists when a decision-maker can choose between two or more legally-
valid options in a way that affects the penal sanction that may be inflicted on an offender upon his 
conviction. Sentencing discretion, to clarify, is exercised not only by judges but also by other actors 
whose decisions have an impact on the sentencing outcome, including prosecutors. 
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other central common law and civil law systems. Over the last three decades, 
determinate sentencing reforms have proliferated in American law. The scope 
and range of mandatory penalties increased dramatically.2 Numerical 
sentencing guidelines were adopted in most of the states and in the federal 
system.3 Many jurisdictions abolished their parole system or imposed statutory 
restrictions on the discretion of parole authorities.4 Despite the growing 
Americanization of political debates over crime problems in various Western 
democracies, these models of determinate sentencing legislation did not find a 
market across the Atlantic. The number of offenses liable to mandatory 
sentences in other Western democracies has remained significantly lower than 
in the United States. European systems did not adopt “truth in sentencing” laws 
or similar statutory mechanisms to restrict the early release of prisoners. And 
no other country has imported the American version of numerical sentencing 
guidelines. 
This article considers why the idea of determinate sentencing reform has 
gained such prominence in post-1970s American law but has not had a similar 
influence in other Western legal systems. This inquiry has important 
implications regarding two central topics in comparative law and criminal 
justice. First, the claim that the standard mechanisms serving to regulate 
sentencing discretion in the American legal system today are considerably more 
formalized, rigid, and restrictive than those operating in civil law systems (as 
well as in other common law jurisdictions) seems to be at odds with the 
conventional way in which the essentials of American and European 
conceptions of adjudication are characterized in comparative law scholarship. 
American conceptions of adjudication are usually associated with a pragmatist 
approach to judicial lawmaking,5 a willingness to recognize the policymaking 
function of courts,6 and a “jurisprudential style” that gives much greater weight 
to substantive values of justice than other legal systems are willing to provide.7 
The European legal tradition, by contrast, has long been famous for its striving 
to minimize the scope of judicial discretion and for its tendency to rely on 
codified legal norms for furthering that goal. In this context, both the 
proliferation of determinate sentencing mechanisms in American law and the 
resistance of European policymakers to adopt these mechanisms raise 
important questions for comparative legal scholarship. 
The second context of comparative scholarship in which it is important to 
analyze the differences between American and European sentencing policies 
 
 2.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 3.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 4.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 5.  Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
 6.  MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE (1998). 
 7.  P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987). 
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pertains to the debate about the impact of the United States on the policies of 
other national legal systems in the current era of globalization. The United 
States has been a prominent exporter of ideas in the criminal justice field since 
the nineteenth century. The attractiveness of America’s penal innovations in 
the eyes of continental observers found a famous expression in Alexis De 
Tocqueville’s classic study The American Penitentiary and its Application in 
France.8 The English borrowing of the pioneering models of parole and 
probation originally developed in Massachusetts in the late nineteenth century 
provides another early example of the migration of American models of 
criminal justice across the Atlantic.9 However, in light of the hegemonic role of 
the United States in shaping the contours of global economic, cultural, and 
political trends in the post-Cold War era, it is often argued that the impact of 
American political values, cultural attitudes, and models of legislation on the 
practices of other nations has increased dramatically.10 As Michael Tonry and 
Kathleen Hatlestad summarize this conventional wisdom (with which they 
disagree),11 “reformers in other countries are following a decade or more later 
in the American footsteps to the same destination and are at various stages 
along the way. Just as it was once often said that California’s present was 
America’s future, America’s today could be other countries’ tomorrow.”12 
Indeed, to examine whether the novel American models of determinate 
sentencing legislation are likely to spread globally it is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that they have not yet been widely adopted by other legal systems. 
After all, their global diffusion may only be a matter of time. Therefore, a 
comparative analysis of this question must be grounded in an understanding of 
the structural political and institutional features that have brought American 
and European policymakers to proceed along contradictory paths while 
designing their sentencing policy over the last decades. This article pursues this 
goal by examining two interlocking questions. First, what structural features of 
American law and American politics have stimulated the recent proliferation of 
determinate sentencing reform in the United States? Second, to what extent do 
the structural conditions shaping the contours of sentencing policy in 
contemporary European states enable and constrain the transplantations of 
 
 8.  See GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE AMERICAN PENITENTIARY 
AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (1979). 
 9.  Arie Frieberg, Three Strikes and You’re Out—It’s Not Cricket: Colonization and Resistance in 
Australian Sentencing, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 29, 31 (Michael 
Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001). 
 10.  See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study of U.S. Hegemony and Latin 
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of 
American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991). 
 11.  Indeed, Michael Tonry’s comparative works offer some of the most important rebuttals of the 
tendency to generalize from the American experience on the future direction of other countries. See, 
e.g., Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2007). 
 12.  MICHAEL TONRY & KATHLEEN HATLESTAD, SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED 
TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (1997). 
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these American models of reform?13 A cluster of outstanding comparative 
works published over the last decade have helped us to develop a more 
profound understanding of the political, cultural, and institutional determinants 
that have shaped the contradictory trajectories of American and European 
approaches to criminal justice policy in the late-modern era.14 This article draws 
on and seeks to contribute to this literature by illuminating the distinctive role 
played by sentencing reform within the larger terrain of criminal justice 
policymaking. 
Part II of this article depicts the current differences between the United 
States and other central common law and civil law systems with regard to the 
forms, extent, and effects of determinate sentencing regimes. Part III discusses 
the political underpinnings of these differences. By analyzing the ideological 
and institutional conditions that shape sentencing policymaking processes in the 
United States, continental Europe, and England and Wales, the article explains 
the factors that have enabled and constrained the spread of determinate 
sentencing laws in different national settings. Part IV considers the influence of 
the institutional design of judicial and prosecutorial processes in the United 
States and Europe on the way in which sentencing discretion is being regulated, 
and on the ability of different legislative models of structuring sentencing 
discretion to achieve their intended aims. Part V summarizes the article’s main 
arguments, and situates them within the wider context of the transformation of 
constitutional orders in contemporary democracies. 
II 
LAWS REGULATING SENTENCING DISCRETION:  
THE UNITED STATES AS AN OUTLIER 
The mid-1970s signaled a notable shift in dominant ideas about the purposes 
and procedures of criminal sentencing in the United States. Over most of the 
preceding century, the sentencing structures of individual states and of the 
 
 13.  There might be a disagreement on how to position recent trends in English sentencing policy 
within the context of the widening divide between the United States and continental Europe. In my 
view, it is more accurate to describe the current American approach to the regulation of sentencing 
discretion as an outlier to the policy principles of other Western nations (which, in the European 
context, includes both the United Kingdom and continental nation-states) rather than as a variant of a 
broader common law approach. This view will be defended in part II by demonstrating that common 
law systems refused to adopt the American models of determinate sentencing legislation, a refusal 
grounded in a profound criticism of the assumptions and principles underlying these reforms. The 
following parts will shed light on the reasons for this reaction, highlighting some major structural 
differences in how sentencing policy is designed and implemented in the United States and in other 
common law systems. 
 14.  See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); 
Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004); TONRY, supra 
note 12. 
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federal system were premised on the model of indeterminate sentencing, in 
which judges and parole boards were authorized to set the offender’s penalty 
within a broad range of statutory options. In an era in which the social 
reintegration of offenders was perceived as the primary aim of the penal system, 
professional trust in the ability of judicial and parole authorities to tailor each 
offender’s penalty to his individual prospects of desisting from crime led to the 
proliferation of indeterminate sentencing regimes. The dominance of 
indeterminate sentencing came under fierce criticism in the 1970s as part of a 
broader crisis of the ideology of penal welfarism.15 Criminological literature of 
the period raised new concerns regarding the achievability of the rehabilitative 
aims of the penal system.16 Normative writers questioned the compatibility of 
the indeterminate sentencing approach with basic notions of proportionality 
and equality in light of its failure to address the potential for arbitrary or 
discriminatory exercise of discretion by individual judges.17 In the political 
debate, liberal critics argued that indeterminate sentencing was prone to 
reinforce racial disparities in the administration of criminal justice in light of its 
failure to control racial biases,18 while conservative commentators stressed its 
failure to prevent undue leniency in sentencing.19 
The convergence of these various strands of political and criminological 
critique created increasing pressures to transform the principles and procedures 
of American sentencing. The final decades of the twentieth century were 
marked by the emergence of new legislative trends which sought to increase the 
determinacy and severity of criminal sentences. Among these legislative trends, 
three have been particularly influential: (1) the growing use of mandatory 
penalties, (2) the introduction of numerical sentencing guidelines, and (3) the 
imposition of statutory restrictions on prisoners’ eligibility for parole (under the 
banner of “truth-in-sentencing” laws). I now move to introduce these three 
legislative trends, and to consider the extent to which they have had an impact 
on sentencing policy outside the United States. As will be shown, continental 
systems and other common law systems have rejected these three major models 
of American sentencing reform. The determinants shaping the widening divide 
between the sentencing structures of the United States and those of other 
Western democracies will be analyzed in the following sections. 
 
 15.  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 8 (2001). 
 16.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT 
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 61 (1995). 
 17.  See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). 
 18.  See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971). 
 19.  See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975). 
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A.  Mandatory Penalties in the United States and in Europe 
The first vehicle of determinate sentencing reform in American law has 
been the enactment of mandatory penalties. Until the mid-1970s, criminal codes 
in the United States included very few mandatory sentences. The existing 
provisions applied to a narrow class of offenses, such as murder, drunk driving, 
and drug trafficking.20 Furthermore, the post-WWII decades have seen a 
constant decline in the number of mandatory penalties. This trend culminated 
with the repeal of nearly all federal mandatory penalties for drug offenses by 
the U.S. Congress in 1970 following a series of critical reports that questioned 
the utility of such measures.21 As a result, the change of course taken by 
American legislatures since the early 1980s was dramatic. With the increasing 
politicization and more punitive tone of criminal justice policy in the 1980s, the 
idea of determinate sentencing enjoyed a notable renaissance. State and 
national legislatures began to introduce mandatory penalty laws to tackle an 
ever wider ambit of criminal offenses, including drug possession and aggravated 
forms of various felonies.22 In Florida, for example, the state legislature enacted 
seven new mandatory sentencing bills between 1988 and 1990 alone; the U.S. 
Congress enacted at least twenty new mandatory penalty provisions between 
1985 and 1991.23 
The massive expansion of mandatory penalties gained further momentum in 
the 1990s. Mandatory sentences began to be increasingly used to address the 
problem of repeat offending. Earlier provisions of mandatory sentencing laws 
sought to address the aggravated harmfulness or moral wrongfulness of 
particular criminal conducts. In the 1990s, however, such legislation began to 
target the problem of recidivism per se, while setting a much lower threshold 
with regard to the severity of the offenses liable to such penalties. The most 
salient example of this trend has been the proliferation of “Three Strikes and 
You’re Out” laws. Typically providing for an enhanced penalty on the second 
conviction and for a lengthy imprisonment on the third conviction (for example, 
in California, twenty-five years to life), no less than twenty-four states had 
enacted “Three Strikes” laws between 1993 and 1995.24 Congress supported the 
proliferation of this legislation not only by enacting a federal statute subjecting 
the perpetration of a third federal felony to life imprisonment;25 it also created a 
range of fiscal incentives for the states to enact such laws.26 As a result of the 
inflation of mandatory sentencing laws for repeat offenders, the ability of 
 
 20.  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 142 (1996). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING 
AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 229 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). 
 23.  TONRY, supra note 20, at 146. 
 24.  JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: A 
REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1 (1997). 
 25.  18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006). 
 26.  KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 59 (2d ed. 2004). 
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American judges to impose non-custodial sanctions on convicted offenders has 
been significantly constrained. To use one salient example of this trend, in the 
state of Arizona in the fiscal year 1990, the expansiveness of mandatory 
sentencing laws made no less than fifty-seven percent of all felony offenders 
subject to mandatory sentence enhancement.27 
The United States has not been alone in expanding the use of mandatory 
sentences over the last decades. However, the extent of mandatory sentencing 
legislation is much narrower in other legal systems. Such legislation usually 
applies to a narrow class of severe offenses such as drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and sexual abuse of minors rather than 
to recidivist patterns of milder offenses.28 Determinate sentencing laws outside 
the United States are usually formulated in a more flexible fashion, typically 
leaving judges with discretion to consider mitigating factors to avoid unduly 
harsh sentences.29 America’s status as an outlier with regard to the use of 
mandatory penalties can be most clearly understood when these laws are placed 
within the broader context of recent shifts in the philosophy of sentencing 
policy. As Anthony Bottoms has observed, in continental Europe, as well as in 
the United Kingdom and Australia, the introduction in recent decades of 
mandatory sentences for the most severe offenses has coincided with a 
counteracting trend of the decreasing use of imprisonment for penalizing less-
serious crime.30 This strategy of severity bifurcation allows governments to 
respond to public pressures to act against the most widely censured types of 
crime while avoiding excessive increases in their prison population. By contrast, 
in the United States, the proliferation of mandatory penalties has been a part 
and parcel of a broader shift towards a “zero tolerance” approach, which 
applies not only to severe crimes, but also to low-level offenses.31 
The differences between the European strategy of severity bifurcation and 
the American strategy of “zero tolerance” can hardly be overstated. In 
European sentencing law, new legal doctrines and institutional mechanisms 
were created over the last four decades to reduce the use of custodial 
penalties.32 In Germany, the “day fine” system—which allows judges to 
commute time servable into fines, tailored both to the defendant’s earning 
power and to his degree of culpability—has expanded dramatically from the 
late 1960s to the present.33 By the mid-1990s, day fines were used to penalize 
about 25% of offenders sentenced for “aggravated theft” (including burglary), 
 
 27.  TONRY, supra note 20, at 146. 
 28.  WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 71. 
 29.  See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 226 (5th ed. 2010). 
 30.  Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Sentencing, in THE POLITICS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 17, 40 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1996). 
 31.  JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 101 (2007). 
 32.   SONJA SNACKEN & DIRK VAN ZYL SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRISON LAW AND 
POLICY 86–98 (2009). 
 33.   Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 120 (2004). 
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50% of all drug offenders, and 85% of offenders charged with simple theft or 
assault.34 These figures stand in sharp contrast with the penalties for comparable 
offenses in the United States. For instance, as of 1994, seventy-five percent of 
burglars were sentenced to either prison or jail in American state courts.35 The 
War on Drugs, with its heavy use of determinate sentencing provisions for 
possession offenses, has extensively targeted drug users (rather than drug 
dealers), a class of offenders that in Europe is treated mostly through a 
combination of non-custodial sanctions and therapeutic measures.36 Various 
other examples can be drawn from increased American reliance on 
incarceration to enforce low-level, “quality of life” crimes.37 Ultimately, these 
differences in sentencing strategies are pronounced in the marked gaps between 
the average imprisonment periods across the Atlantic. In 1996, the average time 
served in American state prisons was twenty-eight months, whereas in France it 
was eight months.38 
The differences between the American and European approaches to 
mandatory sentencing laws are pronounced not only in the extent of such 
legislation and in the sentencing philosophy underpinning its enactment. They 
are also likely to characterize the societal and institutional effects that these 
laws generate. Máximo Langer has demonstrated that, even in policy areas in 
which the impact of Americanization is noticeable with regard to the formal 
adoption of new policies, European policies are unlikely to resemble their 
American counterparts because they operate within an institutional culture 
shaped by inquisitorial rules and values.39 Accordingly, even in those foreign 
jurisdictions in which American models of mandatory penalties were or will be 
formally adopted, such reforms will not easily facilitate substantive policy 
convergence at the level of “law in action” as long as deep-seated differences of 
professional values and institutional practices shall continue to prevail. 
In the United States, it has been repeatedly shown that mandatory penalty 
laws did not eliminate the role of discretion in shaping sentencing outcomes. 
Instead, they shifted the control over the outcomes of the sentencing process 
from the judges to the prosecutors.40 In a system in which ninety-five percent of 
criminal trials are concluded by a guilty plea,41 one of the major effects of 
determinate sentencing laws is in how they affect the dynamics of charge 
 
 34.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Post-Adjudication Dispositions in Comparative Perspective, in 
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 293, 310 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase 
eds., 2001). 
 35.  WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 72. 
 36.  MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 6 (2002). 
 37.  Reitz, supra note 22, at 241–44. 
 38.  WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 70. 
 39.  See Langer, supra note 14. 
 40.  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 
YALE L.J. 1240 (2008). 
 41.  Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 145, 148 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009). 
07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
No.1 2013] DETERMINATE SENTENCING  169 
bargaining and fact bargaining between prosecutors and defense attorneys. In 
this respect, it is clear that the spread of mandatory sentences has substantially 
increased the leverage of prosecutors in plea-bargaining negotiations, as these 
negotiations are now conducted in the shadow of more predictable and more 
severe penalties. Moreover, determinate sentencing laws have weakened the 
ability of judges to mitigate the consequences to the defendant of prosecutorial 
decisions that seem to be suspicious of discriminatory or arbitrary exercises of 
discretion. However, when transplanted in the different institutional settings 
that prevail in European legal systems, mandatory penalties will not necessarily 
produce similar effects. Although many continental systems have recently 
moved in the direction of allowing the prosecutor and the defendant to reach an 
agreement over the charges (and, in some jurisdictions, over the sentence to 
which they will appeal), judges in continental systems are much less constrained 
by such agreements, and they continue to have independent responsibility to 
determine the defendant’s guilt as well as his sentence.42 Even in England and 
Wales, where defendants can bargain with prosecutors over the charges but not 
over the penalties, the impact of mandatory penalties on the dynamics of plea 
bargaining also seems less consequential than in the United States. In part IV of 
this article, I will analyze the institutional determinants that shape the patterns 
of divergence and convergence with respect to the effects of mandatory penalty 
laws in different jurisdictions. 
B.  Sentencing Guidelines in the United States and in Europe 
A second prolific avenue of determinate sentencing reform in post-1980 
American law has been the introduction of numerical sentencing guidelines. 
The idea of introducing formal guidelines into the American sentencing system 
was first advocated by liberal commentators in the early 1970s as a means of 
reinforcing values of legality, uniformity, and transparency in sentencing. In an 
oft-cited statement of this liberal vision, federal judge Marvin Frankel criticized 
“the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.”43 He 
argued that the creation of sentencing commissions and guidelines was 
necessary to eliminate the “unruliness” then pervading American sentencing.44 
Before long, the idea of sentencing guidelines began to be supported by 
conservative critics of the criminal justice system, who advocated their adoption 
as a means to prevent the imposition of lenient sentences by liberal, “soft on 
crime” judges.45 Thus, the system that emerged out of these converging concerns 
of liberal and conservative circles has given emphasis not only to the values of 
uniformity and transparency, but also to perceived urgency of “getting tough” 
on crime. 
 
 42.  See Langer, supra note 14. 
 43.  FRANKEL, supra note 17, at 49. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  GARLAND, supra note 15, at 59. 
07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
170 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:161  
The predominant way of formulating the sentencing guidelines in the 
United States is based on a two-dimensional grid, with the seriousness of the 
offense on one axis and the criminal history score on the other axis.46 Based on 
the intersection of these two parameters, the guidelines provide a presumptive 
sentencing range, within which the judge is expected to reach her final decision. 
Sentencing guidelines in the United States typically require judges to provide 
“substantial and compelling reasons” to justify a departure from the 
presumptive sentencing range.47 The standard of appellate review over these 
sentencing decisions varies from state to state. However, even in jurisdictions in 
which a more deferential standard is taken by appellate courts, American 
judges are more constrained than their peers in other common law systems with 
regard to their authority to consider case-specific circumstances as mitigating 
factors.48 Alongside the mechanisms of appellate review, some states (such as 
Pennsylvania and Washington) publicize statistical data regarding the departure 
rates of individual judges.49 In a system in which most of the judges are elected 
to office by public vote, the publication of such data serves as another tool to 
incentivize judicial compliance with the guidelines. 
It is important not to lose sight of the different variants of sentencing 
guidelines systems that operate today in the United States. In some states, 
particularly those in which commissions were authorized to consider prison 
capacity when establishing presumptive sentence ranges, sentencing guidelines 
have had a moderating effect on the pro-growth tendencies of the prison 
population; in other states, the guidelines reinforced populist law-and-order 
crusades.50 Still, the American experience with sentencing guidelines clearly 
continues to be regarded as unappealing by other nations.51 To date, the idea of 
numerical guidelines has failed to find a market outside American borders. No 
continental system has adopted sentencing guidelines. Among common law 
systems, New Zealand is the only country that has introduced a system of 
numerical guidelines (itself structured in a more flexible fashion than the typical 
American model).52 As Julian Roberts has shown in his contribution to this 
issue, the new system of sentencing guidelines introduced in England and Wales 
in 2009 vests English judges with a considerably higher degree of discretion 
 
 46.  Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy 
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1201 (2005). 
 47.  Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guidelines Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal 
and State Experience, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1482 (1997). 
 48.  Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales: Recent Developments and 
Emerging Issues, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 1. 
 49.  Frase, supra note 46, at 1199. 
 50.  See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reform, 
6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 123 (1993). 
 51.  Michael Tonry, Parochialism in U.S. Sentencing Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 48, 60 
(1999). 
 52.  See Warren Young & Andrea King, Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand, 22 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 254 (2010). 
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than is provided under the American models.53 In addition to England and 
Wales, public committees that considered whether to introduce and how to 
design new systems of sentencing guidelines in Canada, Western Australia, and 
Israel have all rejected the American model of numerical guidelines. Judges, 
scholars, and policymakers who participated in these public debates have widely 
criticized the failure of presumptive numerical guidelines to allow judges to 
recognize the factual variations between different cases and to adjust the 
punishment to the specific circumstances of the offender and the offense.54 The 
fact that the evidence on the negative consequences of numerical guidelines was 
more consequential in shaping the policy outcomes outside the United States is 
telling. As I will argue below, the resistance to the American model in 
continental and commonwealth legal systems is not only a product of 
ideological disagreement. It is also a result of the different degrees to which 
evidence-based arguments have an impact on the policy choices that are 
eventually made. In continental Europe in particular, the policymaking process 
is more insulated from popular pressures and provides scholars and 
administrative elites with much greater influence over the design and 
institutionalization of policy reforms. This difference has provided judges and 
other professional groups outside the United States with more effective tools to 
resist reform initiatives that strengthen the legislative control over the 
sentencing process. 
Outside the United States, two alternative models have emerged over the 
last decades to promote similar purposes to those pursued by the American 
guidelines movement. The first model is based on the development of clearer 
statutory statements of the principles of sentencing and of their proper 
application in individual cases. Since the late 1980s, Sweden has operated a 
system of principle–guidelines, clarifying the primacy given to considerations 
related to the offender’s culpability over utilitarian aims and providing judges 
with parameters to determine the “penal value” of the criminal conduct in 
individual cases.55 Different versions of this model subsequently developed in 
other Scandinavian countries over the next two decades. Interestingly enough, 
the Scandinavian model of principle–guidelines also grew out of an increasing 
criticism of the rehabilitative ideal,56 and a rising consensus that retributive 
principles (as refined under contemporary theories of just desert) provide a 
more solid foundation to the legitimization of state punishment.57 The fact that 
 
 53.  Roberts, supra note 48, at 5 
 54.  For examples from England and Wales, see ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 418; for examples 
from Australia, see Freiberg, supra note 9, at 29. 
 55.  Andrew Von Hirsch, Numerical Grids or Guiding Principles?, in THE SENTENCING 
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 47 (Andrew Von Hirsch, Michael Tonry & Kay A. Knapp eds., 
1987). 
 56.  Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the Repressive 
Ideal, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 92, 107 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. 
Frase eds., 2001). 
 57.  John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part I: The Nature and 
07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
172 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:161  
the Scandinavian reaction against rehabilitation took a radically different 
trajectory than the American counterpart is intriguing. As Andrew Von Hirsch 
notes, compared with the American model of numeric sentencing guidelines, 
the Scandinavian model vests much greater responsibility in the hands of 
appellate courts. Whereas in a numerical system of sentencing guidelines 
appellate courts are mainly required to monitor compliance with the tariffs 
specified in the grid, in the Swedish model courts actively construct the penal 
standards by interpreting and applying these principles throughout the 
development of their case law.58 
In other common law systems, the effort to develop more consistent and 
coherent sentencing standards has led to the development of “guideline 
judgments” by courts of appeal. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division in 
England and Wales has been issuing such guidelines since the 1970s.59 Appellate 
courts in Western Australia and New South Wales adopted this practice in the 
1990s.60 Guidelines judgment usually seek to clarify the main aggravating and 
mitigating factors with respect to particular offenses and in some cases suggest 
appropriate starting points or a range of sentences.61 Judges are expected to 
consider these judgments while tailoring the sentence to the facts of the case.62 
However, both in England and in Australia, the guidelines judgments are not 
considered to be formally binding, and appellate courts have emphasized the 
need to apply them in light of the general principles of discretionary sentencing 
inherent in the tradition of English sentencing.63 
C.  Laws Restricting the Possibility of Early Release in and Outside the United 
States 
One of the issues that attracted the fiercest criticism by proponents of 
determinate sentencing reform in the United States was the discrepancy 
between the length of prison term imposed on convicted offenders by the courts 
and the actual time they eventually served. This discrepancy was a product of 
the extensive use of early release mechanisms in the system of indeterminate 
sentencing. In a political setting that defined the rehabilitation and social 
reintegration of offenders as central tasks of penal institutions, early release 
mechanisms such as parole and “time for good behavior” were perceived as 
important devices to tailor the actual prison term of every individual offender 
to his prospects of desisting from crime.64 The increasing use of early release 
 
Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism, 48 BRIT. J. CRIM. 119, 133 (2008). 
 58.  Von Hirsch, supra note 55, at 57–58. 
 59.  Andrew Ashworth, The Decline of English Sentencing and Other Stories, in SENTENCING AND 
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 62, 73 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001). 
 60.  Freiberg, supra note 9, at 36–37. 
 61.  ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 36. 
 62.  See e.g., R v. Johnson, 15 Cr. App. R. 827, 830 (1994). 
 63.  ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 36–37. 
 64.  JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE 
UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 123 (1993). 
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mechanisms across Europe and in the United States was part and parcel of the 
growing bureaucratic capacities and public legitimacy of welfare states, a 
historical process that culminated in the post-WWII era. Because the legitimacy 
of these early release practices depended on the credibility of the penal system’s 
stated capacities to rehabilitate offenders (and, at a deeper level, hinged on the 
degree of public trust in the capacity of the state to reduce crime levels through 
welfarist forms of supervision and intervention), these practices came under 
increasing criticism as part of the broader legitimation crisis of the modern 
welfare state. Indeed, in the 1970s, the extensive use of early release 
mechanisms in times of mounting crime rates came to be seen as a telling 
symptom of the chronic failure of the welfare state to deliver its “social 
engineering” aspirations.65 
With the radicalization of law-and-order politics in the 1980s, statutory 
reforms restricting offenders’ eligibility for early release became popular among 
American legislatures. Early legislation in this field focused on establishing 
parole guidelines in an attempt to structure the discretion of parole boards in 
setting release dates.66 Later on, legislatures in various states began to abolish 
parole altogether or to substantially restrict its scope. By the late 1990s, 
fourteen states and the federal system had abolished early release based on the 
discretion of the parole board for all offenders, while several others abolished 
parole release for certain felony offenders.67 Most of the states that did not 
abolish their parole system introduced new laws requiring offenders to serve a 
substantial portion of their prison sentence. These laws, which proliferated 
under the banner of “truth in sentencing” legislation, became widespread 
throughout the 1990s. To date, at least twenty-seven states require certain types 
of offenders to serve eighty-five percent of their prison sentences before 
obtaining eligibility for early release.68 The federal government played a key 
role in prodding the spread of these laws. The Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized the federal government to provide 
incentive grants to states which denied prisoners’ eligibility to early parole 
before completing eighty-five percent of their sentence.69 In the following year, 
not less than eleven states adopted such legislation.70 
During the same period, no other legal system outside the United States 
abolished its system of early release. In several countries, legislatures required 
courts to take further considerations while exercising their discretion in early 
release decisions. For example, in Germany, the Penal Code was amended in 
 
 65.  GARLAND, supra note 15, at 65–68. 
 66.  Keith A. Bottomley, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments and 
Prospects for the 1990s, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 319 (Michael Tonry & 
Norval Morris eds., 1990). 
 67.  PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS J. WILSON, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  42 U.S.C. § 13704(a) (2006). 
 70.  Id. 
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1998 to require judges to consider “the safety interests of the public” when 
determining the prisoner’s eligibility for early release.71 Another recent reform 
in German law requires the courts to consult an expert witness to assess the 
offender’s continued dangerousness in cases in which his offense had caused 
bodily harm.72 These amendments change the normative framework within 
which European judges reach sentencing decisions. However, by steering clear 
of introducing specific numerical prescriptions regarding the minimum time 
prisoners must serve before obtaining eligibility for early release, they retain 
the discretionary framework that recent American legislation in this field has 
sought to curtail. 
In France and many other European countries, judicial discretion with 
regard to the offender’s eligibility for early release has not been substantially 
constrained by legislation.73 True, there is evidence that the actual rates of 
conditional release have declined over the last two decades and it is possible to 
attribute this trend to the rise of a more punitive public attitude. However, a 
plausible alternative explanation would link this development to recent changes 
in the composition of the prison population in light of the decreasing use of 
imprisonment to penalize low-level offenses. As the prison population becomes 
dominated by offenders convicted for serious offenses (as opposed to the 
current situation in the United States),74 the rates of prisoners found eligible for 
early release is likely to decrease. In this respect, the declining rates of early 
release in European countries are rooted in institutional and political changes 
that are quite contradictory to those fuelling the legislative restrictions on 
eligibility for parole in America. 
In a trend that even more pronouncedly diverges from the American 
experience, some European systems have introduced mechanisms of mandatory 
early release over the last two decades. In 1998, Sweden instituted a system of 
nearly universal mandatory release in which all inmates sentenced to an 
imprisonment period of more than one month must be given conditional release 
once they have served two thirds of their sentence.75 English parole policy, 
following a reform that came into force in 1992, combines mandatory regimes of 
early release for short sentences (less than four years) and discretionary regimes 
for long sentences (four years and more).76 This policy is integrated into the 
broader strategy of severity bifurcation that seeks to relieve fiscal pressures on 
 
 71.  See Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND 
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 211–12 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001). 
 72.  Id. at 211. 
 73.  See Pierre V. Tournier, Systems of Conditional Release in the Member States of the Council of 
Europe, 1 CHAMP PÉNAL (2004). 
 74.  See supra Part II.A. 
 75.  Tournier, supra note 73. 
 76.  Stephen Shute, The Development of Parole and the Role of Research in its Reform, in THE 
CRIMINOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PENAL POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER HOOD 377 
(Lucia Zedner & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2003). 
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the correctional system through “decarcerating” the treatment of low-level 
offenses. 
III 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE  
REGULATION OF SENTENCING DISCRETION 
Why, then, has the American approach to the regulation of sentencing 
discretion become an outlier to international standards? Why has it come to 
rely on more formalized statutory schemes for structuring the exercise of 
discretion and to establish penal standards that are much harsher than those 
prevailing in other Western legal systems? In this section, I argue that some of 
the major factors shaping American exceptionalism in this field are found in the 
extensive degree to which sentencing policymaking is attached to ordinary 
politics in the United States. A set of interlocking constitutional and political 
arrangements that distinguish the United States from other Western 
democracies makes American criminal justice policymakers more vulnerable to 
electoral pressures to adopt populist responses to crime. The discussion that 
follows examines how these constitutional and political arrangements have 
facilitated the mobilization of popular demand and political support of the 
entrenchment of determinate sentencing reforms in the United States, and why 
the arrangements structuring sentencing policymaking in European 
democracies do not provide political openings to the mobilization of such 
reforms. 
As Carol Steiker points out, 
In the United States . . . in comparison to the rest of the industrialized West . . . crime 
has a political salience that is extraordinarily high, almost impossible to overstate. As a 
result, themes of “law and order” tend to dominate electoral battles at all levels of 
governments, and the designation “soft on crime” tends to be a political liability of 
enormous and generally untenable consequence for political actors at all levels of 
government.
77
 
Along with the increasing politicization of criminal justice policy over the 
last several decades, the traditional left–right ideological conflicts over the 
required responses to crime problems have weakened, as the policy frames of 
both major parties came to converge around a shared set of ultra-punitive 
assumptions and solutions.78 These interlocking changes in the political salience 
and ideological orientation of criminal justice policy help to explain both the 
explosion of statutory sentencing reforms since the 1970s, and the more populist 
tone of that legislation. Indeed, many recent forms of determinate sentencing 
legislation seem to emphasize sound-bite political slogans that can hardly be 
squared with criminological knowledge on the actual impacts of such policies 
 
 77.  Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OREG. L. REV. 97, 113 
(2002). 
 78.  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–41 (2011). 
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(for example, “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” “10–20–Life,” “Life Means 
Life,” “Adult Time for Adult Crime,” and “Hard Time for Armed Crime”).79 
At the institutional level, one of the distinctive features of American 
democracy that enables sound-bite political slogans to gain such an influence on 
sentencing policy has been the widespread use of direct democracy tools 
alongside the more established channels of parliamentary representation.80 
Among the different tools of direct democracy available in the contemporary 
United States (including popular referendum, legislative referral, and recall 
elections), the most consequential on the direction of criminal justice policy has 
been the ballot initiative. In force today in twenty-four states, the ballot 
initiative process provides a mechanism by which citizens, upon collection of a 
specified number of voter signatures, may propose new statutory or 
constitutional provisions for voter consideration.81 Proposals that win the 
popular vote may be written into law without having to pass through the 
ordinary channels of parliamentary legislation. The use of direct democracy 
tools in American politics dates back to the 1890s.82 However, the number of 
initiatives placed on statewide ballots as well as their impact on the 
policymaking process has increased dramatically since the late 1970s. In the 
1980s and 1990s, American citizens voted on 271 and 389 statewide initiatives, 
respectively, compared with a comparable figure of less than 100 statewide 
initiatives conducted throughout the 1960s.83 The growing prominence of 
initiatives has considerably supported (and was itself facilitated by) the 
expanding involvement of social movements in mobilizing sentencing reform. 
Many of the more populist versions of determinate sentencing legislation were 
enacted following successful ballot initiatives. The proliferation of the “Three 
Strikes and You’re Out” legislation, a reform that redesigned state penal 
practices in accordance with the logic of a famous baseball rule, provides a 
telling example.84 The idea of subjecting recidivist offenders to life 
imprisonment upon their third conviction was initiated by grassroots activists 
and adopted by a citizen’s initiative in the state of Washington in 1993.85 Within 
the next three years, twenty-four states had adopted such legislation.86 The 
spread of this legislation exemplifies the spillover effect of ballot initiatives on 
 
 79.  GARLAND, supra note 15, at 13. 
 80.  See Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A. Smith, Representation and Direct Democracy in the United 
States, 42 REPRESENTATION 25 (2006). 
 81.  Larry J. Sabato, Bruce A. Larson & Howard R. Ernst, Introduction, in DANGEROUS 
DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA ix–x (Larry J. Sabato, Howard 
R. Ernst & Bruce A. Larson eds., 2001). 
 82.  Howard Ernst, The Historical Role of Narrow-Material Interests, in DANGEROUS 
DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 1, 10. 
 83.  Tolbert & Smith, supra note 80, at 26. 
 84.  See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001). 
 85.  VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT 118 (2009). 
 86.  CLARK ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. 
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the rhetoric and policy choices of legislatures.87 By mobilizing grassroots 
activists, media attention, and funding in support of particular policy frames, 
the strategic use of initiatives by social movements often has a considerable 
agenda-setting effect, providing legislatures both with stronger incentives and 
with new opportunities to endorse populist policy reforms. In light of 
foreseeable budgetary implications and the weak criminological evidence in 
support of the rationale of “Three Strikes” laws,88 it is highly questionable 
whether this policy model could have been originally passed into law by 
reasonably-informed legislatures. The passage of these statutes via plebiscite 
campaigns paved the way for a nationwide trend that would have faced much 
stronger professionalized and administrative resistance in the legislative 
processes of a pure representative democracy.89 
The structure of democratic politics in other national systems inhibits the 
capability of grassroots social movements to exert direct influence on the 
content of sentencing policy. In democracies such as Germany and England, 
strong degrees of party discipline and majority support in the legislative house 
provide governments with firmer control over the policy agenda.90 Governments 
may—and often do—face pressure to introduce popular “tough on crime” 
reforms, and they have electoral incentives to be responsive to such pressure. 
However, they operate within a constitutional and cultural setting that poses 
much stronger constraints on their capability to pursue electoral gains while 
making policy choices, particularly when these popular reforms face opposition 
from professional experts.91 Whereas the greater leverage of judicial elites and 
professional experts in other systems enable them to ensure better-informed 
and long-term-oriented processes of deliberation over the likely impacts of 
proposed sentencing reforms, the American political system is less capable of 
channeling policy proposals to nonpartisan forums. 
Another catalyst to the politicized nature of sentencing policymaking in the 
United States is associated with the procedures of selecting judges and 
prosecutors. As opposed to other Western nations, most of the judges and 
public prosecutors in the United States are either directly elected by the public 
or are appointed by elected politicians. Over ninety-five percent of county and 
 
 87.  Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Responses to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 99, 124 (1996). 
 88.  Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority: 
Some Reflections on Three Strikes in California, 28 PAC. L. J. 243 (1996). 
 89.  Recent trends in Swiss criminal justice policy provide further evidence of the linkage between 
extensive use of direct democracy tools and the populist character of criminal justice policy. For 
example, in 2010, Swiss voters approved a new constitutional provision requiring the automatic 
expulsion of foreign nationals convicted of certain criminal offenses specified by law, including benefit 
fraud. In 2004, an initiative requiring the lifelong detention of dangerous sexual and violent offenders 
was approved. On the difficulties in reconciling the outcomes of recent initiatives in the field of criminal 
justice with fundamental constitutional rights, see Daniel Moeckli, Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals: 
Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 774 (2011). 
 90.  LACEY, supra note 14, at 70. 
 91.  ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 69 (2001). 
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municipal prosecutors are selected by popular election.92 These selection 
procedures create a strong pressure on judges and prosecutors to be responsive 
to widespread popular resentment toward criminals. As Michael Tonry notes, 
“many American prosecuting attorneys appear constantly to be campaigning 
and often to formulate their general policies and their tactics in individual cases 
on the bases of how they will be reported by journalists and how these reports 
will be received by the general public on the evening news programs.”93 By 
contrast, in continental Europe and in England and Wales, decisions related to 
the appointment and tenure of judges are dominated by senior civil servants in 
the judiciary.94 As will be argued later, the continental model of hierarchic 
organization of the judiciary encourages the compliance of individual judges 
with the policy goals espoused by judicial and professional elites. In the context 
of the relationship between sentencing policy and electoral politics, we should 
note the contribution of these arrangements to relieving the pressure on judges 
to satisfy popular opinion in their rulings. 
It may be argued that the politicized nature of judicial selection procedures 
in the United States reinforces rather than damages the public legitimacy of 
judges because it symbolizes some of the values most central to America’s 
democratic ethos, particularly the values of popular participation and suspicion 
of state authority. Nonetheless, these procedures of judicial selection make it 
more difficult for judges to capitalize on the professional values of judicial 
neutrality and objectivity while opposing political reforms curtailing their 
discretionary powers. In a judicial system that involves so many visible elements 
of politicization, judges are less able to convince the public that the 
intensification of legislative intervention in sentencing matters would encroach 
on their professional prerogatives. As Michael Tonry has noted, “judges 
everywhere oppose efforts to limit their sentencing discretion but have been 
much more successful outside the United States than in. . . . Civil service and 
meritocratically selected judges may appear more professional, nonpartisan, 
and authoritative than elected and politically appointed judges, who may 
appear more political, partisan, and ordinary.”95 
The differences between American and European approaches concerning 
the politicization of sentencing policy have deep historical and ideological roots. 
In the United States, the mobilization of sentencing reform through citizens’ 
initiatives and referendums, the popular election of judges and prosecutors, and 
the weak influence of bureaucratic elites and the academy on the character of 
public policy are all rooted in a distinctive creed of American political culture.96 
American political culture is characterized by a strong preference to defer to 
clear majority sentiments rather than to intellectually-inspired bureaucratic 
 
 92.  Steiker, supra note 77, at 119. 
 93.  Tonry, supra note 51, pp. 61–63. 
 94.  MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 151 (1986). 
 95.  Tonry, supra note 51, at 61. 
 96.  Steiker, supra note 77, at 116. 
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elites.97 Determinate sentencing laws have gained popular support in the United 
States because they epitomize this deep-seated creed of American political 
culture. These laws were advocated as a means to reclaim the people’s role in 
shaping the standards of penal sentencing, so as to better reflect widely held 
views regarding the supremacy of crime-reductive goals over due process 
principles. Proponents of these reforms presented the people’s right to actively 
participate in determining criminal sentences (which in the colonial period was 
institutionalized through vesting the jury with a sentencing function, 
independent of its fact-finding role) as a form of democratic participation that 
was gradually usurped by professional actors (judges and parole officers) 
throughout the entrenchment of the indeterminate sentencing approach.98 In 
this context, it is notable that the constitutional checks imposed on the 
implementation of determinate sentencing laws by the Supreme Court focused 
on strengthening the popular participation in the process by requiring that any 
factor aggravating the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines 
must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt.99 By contrast, 
the debate over the constitutionality of determinate sentencing laws in England, 
for example, focused on their effect on the established principles of judicial 
independence and separation of powers.100 
The American mode of balancing between public participation and 
professional expertise is quite exceptional among modern Western 
democracies. In continental European and British political cultures, there is 
longstanding support of the view that professional experts and senior civil 
servants should play a proactive role in mediating the expression of the popular 
will throughout the policymaking process.101 In Europe, particularly in Germany 
and other states that followed its expert-oriented model of codification, this 
conception harks back to at least the late eighteenth century.102 Although the 
codification project was legitimated as a means to ensure judicial compliance 
with the popular will, in practice, the codes were formulated by an exclusive 
group of elite jurists.103 
The emphasis given in American sentencing policy to ensure the 
responsiveness of judges to the popular will may have some normative appeal. 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, Or 
Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692 (2010). 
 99.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 100.  Ashworth, supra note 59, at 62. 
 101.  Joachim Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC. 911 
(1994). 
 102.  Arguably, scholars in the continental tradition played a prominent role in formulating legal 
codes already in the Roman period. The important parts of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis were 
formulated by jurisconsults, recognized experts on the law who formally had neither legislative nor 
judicial function. See JOHN H. MARRYMAN & REGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 57 (3d ed. 2007). 
 103.  Id. at 31. 
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However, this emphasis makes the American sentencing system vulnerable to a 
cluster of problems associated with the adverse effects of unbridled 
politicization on the legal process. Studies on the nature of public views 
regarding sentencing policy reveal that, although public opinion polls often 
reflect a widespread concern about judicial leniency toward criminals, these 
popular views are often based on overestimations of actual crime rates and on 
underestimations of the average severity of sentences (misjudgments that are 
routinely constructed by the exaggerated and sensationalist style of 
representations of crime in the mass media).104 When provided with more 
accurate and specific information about the particular circumstances of the 
offense in light of the legal framework, respondents are likely to support the 
imposition of penalties that are generally in line with and often more lenient 
than the average sentences imposed by professional judges.105 
Moreover, when we bear in mind that political and legal discourses never 
simply mirror public opinion but also construct public views and sensibilities, 
another explanation of the limited reception of determinate sentencing laws in 
Europe comes to mind. The mechanisms used by European systems to insulate 
sentencing policy from populist pressure not only set limits on the way in which 
punitive sentiments may be expressed by the law. They also shape public 
discourse about crime in a way that, in contrast to the American case, does not 
cultivate the radicalization of popular punitive sentiments. Political debates 
about criminal justice policy in Europe have exposed the public to much more 
critical and realistic views on the limitations of imprisonment. When we 
recognize that the relationship between public opinion and criminal justice 
policymaking in a democracy is constituted by a cycle of mutual reinforcement, 
in which politicians both respond to and simultaneously construct public 
demand for particular forms of policy intervention to reduce crime levels,106 we 
gain a better understanding of why, even in periods during which European 
democracies such as Germany have experienced rising crime rates, public 
opinion in these nations did not develop an appetite for determinate sentencing 
reforms of the type exemplified by initiatives-driven American models.107 In 
Europe, therefore, legislatures could accommodate popular demands to protect 
the public from the risks of crime by introducing more severe mandatory 
sentences for highly publicized heinous offenses. They did not, however, 
experience similar electoral pressure to expand the scope of such legislation to 
more ordinary crimes or to engage in symbolic displays of legislative control 
over sentencing matters by imposing strict restrictions on the discretionary 
powers of judges and early-release decision-makers. 
 
 104.  Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes about Punishment: Myth and Reality, in SENTENCING 
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 250 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997). 
 105.  Id. at 253. 
 106.  LACEY, supra note 14, at 71. 
 107.  Nestler, supra note 33, 119–20. 
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IV 
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE REGULATION OF 
SENTENCING DISCRETION 
When we address the problem of disparities in sentencing, it is important to 
recall that sentencing outcomes are shaped by a series of decisions made 
throughout all stages of the criminal process.108 These include not only judicial 
rulings, but also a wide range of decisions made by police officers, prosecutors, 
and juries—among others. To one degree or another, each of these decisions 
involves the exercise of discretion. Thus, a comprehensive framework for 
addressing the way in which the exercise of discretion generates unwarranted 
disparities in sentencing cannot exclusively focus on the final stage in which the 
judge chooses the penalty. It must address the various ways in which other legal 
actors, whose decisions construct the factual and legal grounds on the basis of 
which judges decide to impose particular sentences at the end of the process, 
employ their discretionary powers. 
Drawing on this basic premise, this part presents a twofold argument. First, I 
argue that the more extensive reliance on statutory tools to structure sentencing 
discretion is a product of the American system’s insufficient use of judicial 
mechanisms by which the problem of sentencing disparities may be tackled. The 
more hierarchical and bureaucratized structure of criminal justice institutions in 
continental systems enables them to marshal a wider array of tools to govern 
the way in which various officials, whose decisions have an impact on 
sentencing outcomes, exercise discretion. Second, I suggest that even if the 
introduction of determinate sentencing laws has enabled the American system 
to better regulate an important aspect of the sentencing process—the aspect of 
judicial decision-making—it has simultaneously loosened the regulation of 
other aspects of the sentencing process. The introduction of these laws into a 
system in which prosecutorial discretion is very lightly regulated, and in which 
the vast majority of cases (nearly ninety-five percent) are concluded by guilty 
pleas, has created institutional conditions in which sentencing disparities are 
likely to grow in light of the shift of power from judges to prosecutors. 
European judges operate within an institutional setting radically different 
from that in which American judges perform their judicial functions. The 
judiciary in continental Europe is organized in a highly centralized and 
hierarchical structure. As noted earlier, in many American jurisdictions, judges 
and prosecutors are elected by the public or are appointed by elected 
politicians. By contrast, European judges and prosecutors are career civil 
servants, whose tenure and promotion are predominantly dependent on 
evaluation by superior colleagues.109 Judicial institutions in civil law systems 
employ more extensive and comprehensive mechanisms of appellate review 
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over the decisions of lower courts, as well as mechanisms of judicial oversight of 
prosecutorial decisions.110 These features create a bureaucratic-styled 
organizational context in which judges are, on one hand, more insulated from 
political pressure and, on the other hand, more dependent on judicial elites, and 
thus face a stronger pressure to conform with the organizational norms of the 
judiciary.111 
The greater degree of professional conformity in continental judiciaries 
generates both desirable and undesirable effects, and analyzing all of them here 
would be neither possible nor necessary. The important point for the purpose of 
my argument is that because of the more hierarchical and bureaucratic structure 
of the judiciary, and in light of the more proactive involvement of the judge in 
reviewing prosecutorial decisions, continental systems are equipped with tighter 
mechanisms to scrutinize various decisions that affect the defendant’s 
sentence.112 The contrast with the United States is particularly pronounced with 
respect to the regulation of prosecutorial power. In continental legal systems, 
prosecutors’ charging decisions do not limit the jurisdiction of the court to 
particular offenses and they have a much lighter impact on the judicial 
determination of a sentence.113 The broad investigatory powers exercised by 
continental judges in inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure provide them 
with better tools than those available to their peers in adversarial systems to 
scrutinize the extent to which prosecutorial discretion was exercised in 
conformity with the regular standards in similar cases. In addition, the 
professional ideology shaping the manner in which prosecutors in continental 
systems perceive their role and duties also serves to standardize the way in 
which they exercise their discretionary functions.114 By providing judges with 
formal responsibility and with considerably fuller data to evaluate the 
prosecutor’s decisions on whether to charge and for what offenses, continental 
systems subject to scrutiny a much wider array of decisions that may cause 
disparities in sentencing. 
Compared with continental systems as well as with other common law 
systems, trial judges in the United States possess much weaker tools to review 
the charging and bargaining decisions of prosecutors. As the Supreme Court 
expounded, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the 
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in [the 
prosecutor’s] discretion.”115 This highly deferential approach—which is 
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rationalized by reference to separation of powers principles,116 as well as to 
practical and normative limitations that the adversarial process poses on the 
judge’s ability to evaluate the prosecutor’s charging decision in an informed and 
legitimate manner—inhibits judicial involvement in reviewing allegations to 
unconstitutional bias in prosecutorial decisions. De jure, selective prosecution 
based on race is forbidden in the American system. In practice, no claim of 
racially selective prosecution was accepted by the courts since the 
Reconstruction era.117 The reluctance of American courts to address the impact 
of prosecutorial charging decisions on the problem of racial disparities in 
sentencing is based on the request that the claimant present “evidence that 
similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but 
were not.”118 This requirement is virtually impossible to fulfill in the absence of 
available data on the evidence in light of which prosecutors decided to refrain 
from charging in other cases.119 
In addition, the scope of issues examined in the appellate review process in 
the American system is considerably narrower than is the norm both in 
continental systems and in most other common law jurisdictions. As William 
Pizzi points out, “issues such as whether a particular sentence is consistent with 
the sentences received by similarly situated defendants . . . are not proper 
considerations for appellate review as long as the sentence is within the lawful 
sentencing range.”120 Appellate review was developed in the American system 
much later than in other Western legal systems. Until the 1980s, only a minority 
of states vested their appellate courts with the power to review sentences for 
substantive propriety, and even in those states, courts were willing to intervene 
only in extreme cases of clear abuse of judicial discretion.121 In contrast, in 
continental systems, the defendant’s right to de novo consideration of his 
sentence has become an inherent aspect of the criminal appeal much earlier.122  
This aspect of European sentencing law can be well understood as a product of 
the structural characteristics of the inquisitorial culture of legal procedure. 
Appellate judges in civil law systems have long been provided with a fuller 
informative basis to review the decisions of lower courts (including a formal 
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requirement upon judges to provide written reasons for their sentencing 
decision—a requirement that did not have a parallel in the United States in the 
pre-guidelines era).123 In England and Wales, the defendant’s right to appeal his 
sentence has been recognized since the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1907.124 The corpus of case law developed by the Court of Criminal Appeal over 
the last century has served as a major tool to establish standards of uniformity 
and coherence in English sentencing. 
This brief overview of some of the key differences between the institutional 
contexts in which American and continental judges operate helps to clarify both 
the conditions under which determinate sentencing legislation has proliferated 
in the United States (but not in Europe) and the differences in how this 
legislation is implemented within these very different institutional settings. 
First, even under the assumption that American determinate sentencing laws 
are successful in bringing judges to comply with the sentencing standards they 
prescribe,125 it is clear that the American approach to the governance of 
sentencing discretion is structured in a lopsided manner, with tight regulation of 
judicial discretion and weak checks on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
The problem is not only that the exclusive focus on tightening the regulation of 
judicial discretion is too narrow (covering only a tip of the very big iceberg of 
“discretion in sentencing”) but also that the curtailment of the discretionary 
powers of judges restricts their ability to mitigate the abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. Combined with the tendency of determinate sentencing laws to 
increase prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining,126 there is reason to suspect 
that these laws have exacerbated the peril that the arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
simply unsystematic use of discretion by prosecutors will cause sentencing 
disparities. 
The tendency of determinate sentencing laws to shift power from judges to 
prosecutors is likely to be less pronounced in continental systems than it has 
been in the United States. Although many European systems have recently 
adopted arrangements of “negotiated judgments” that have some similarities 
with the adversarial model of plea bargaining, these arrangements retain a 
much greater level of judicial scrutiny over prosecutorial decisions and only a 
minority of criminal cases are settled by these methods.127 In addition, because 
European systems have adopted only one form of determinate sentencing 
legislation—mandatory penalties, applied to a narrow class of severe offenses—
prosecutors in continental systems are unlikely to gain similar degrees of 
 
 123.  Id. at 355. 
 124.  See Ashworth, supra note 59, at 73. 
 125.  The accuracy of this assumption is far from certain. As Michael Tonry has shown, a sizeable 
bulk of evidence demonstrates that judges, juries, and prosecutors employ a variety of adaptive 
strategies to circumvent the imposition of mandatory sentences that they perceive as too harsh. See 
TONRY, supra note 20, at 146–48. 
 126.  Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancement in a World of Guilty Pleas, 
110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1151–70. 
 127.  Langer, supra note 14. 
07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
No.1 2013] DETERMINATE SENTENCING  185 
influence over sentencing outcomes to those possessed by American 
prosecutors. In the United States, the negative impact of determinate 
sentencing laws in this context has been particularly conspicuous because of 
their synergetic interactions with other institutional arrangements that also 
work to empower prosecutors. For example, as emphasized by William Stuntz 
in a series of seminal works, the breadth and depth of criminal codes in the 
United States create a wealth of overlapping offense definitions and provides 
prosecutors with useful bargaining chips to extract guilty pleas.128 When a 
greater ambit of offenses is subjected to mandatory penalties, the impact of the 
mutually reinforcing institutional deficiencies identified by Stuntz is 
exacerbated, and prosecutors are provided with greater control over the 
determination of sentencing outcomes. 
Moreover, the ideological values that legitimize state punishment in 
continental systems have posed additional barriers to the reception of 
determinate sentencing laws in these systems. These values ground the 
justifiability of state punishment on its being an outcome of a rigorous 
inquisition of the relevant facts. The authority of the judge to determine the 
penal sanction proportional to the perpetrator’s proven guilt is inherently 
linked to the proactive role that he plays in earlier stages of the fact-finding 
inquisition, as well as to his professional commitment to protect the defendant 
against the excesses of state power throughout these earlier stages. Indeed, the 
power of inquisitorial ideals in shaping the practices and professional 
consciousness of European jurists is in decline.129 However, they probably still 
pose some significant barriers to the reception of the more stringent versions of 
determinate sentencing laws. “Truth in sentencing” laws, mandatory penalties, 
and other schemes that prevent the judge from being able to individualize the 
penalty pose a fundamental challenge to the way in which European jurists 
define the values and legitimize the authority of their criminal justice systems. 
In this regard, the failure of determinate sentencing laws to gain momentum 
in continental Europe reflects a profound difference in how each of these 
procedural systems seek to promote values of equality and to reduce sentencing 
disparities. European systems seek to tackle disparities by vesting with the 
judge broad powers to review the decisions of other legal officials and to 
consider whether these decisions are consistent with the manner in which 
similar cases have been administrated. The imposition of statutory constraints 
on judicial discretion in sentencing is likely to damage the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms of review. In the United States, by contrast, the egalitarian ideal of 
treating like cases alike is pursued by means of establishing a standard of 
uniformity with respect to entire classes of offenders. These uniform standards 
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are increasingly dictated by the legislature, which is presented as ideally 
positioned to guarantee the compatibility of sentencing rules with widespread 
public views of the relative gravity of different offenses. The problem is that as 
the mechanisms used to ensure judicial compliance with these generalized 
prescriptions of required penalties take a more formalistic and binding 
character, the ability of the legal system to deliver the other dimension of 
Aristotle’s egalitarian ideal—treating unlike cases differently—is being 
diminished. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The massive expansion of determinate sentencing legislation in 
contemporary American law has been a part and parcel of the broader 
restructuring of American law and politics following the demise of New Deal 
liberalism. The liberal procedural reforms introduced by the American 
Supreme Court in the post-WWII era symbolized the culmination of a decades-
long historical process by which the role of courts in shaping criminal justice 
policy had grown significantly. This growth was a result both of the expansion 
of judges’ discretionary powers throughout the entrenchment of the 
indeterminate sentencing approach and of the constitutionalization of criminal 
procedure. Reflecting the broader decline of public faith in the power of 
government to solve the nation’s major social problems, the determinate 
sentencing movement adapted the deep-seated American creed of “distrust of 
government” to the modern reality of criminal justice governance, in which 
courts play a highly visible role in shaping and implementing public policy.130 
Paradoxically, the liberal concerns regarding the excesses of judicial power 
under the indeterminate sentencing approach initiated a reform movement that 
both facilitated and legitimized the massive expansion of the state’s reliance on 
its most repressive apparatuses—its carceral institutions. 
The fact that determinate sentencing models of legislation were not widely 
adopted outside the United States was explained in this article as a result of the 
structural conditions shaping the processes of criminal lawmaking and the 
institutional processes of reviewing sentencing decisions in both civil law and 
common law systems. The combination of constitutional arrangements 
insulating legislative processes from populist pressures with a robust ideological 
commitment to the values of individualized sentencing poses structural 
impediments to the ability of these formalized and harsh models of sentencing 
legislation to pass through the legislative channels. This ideological 
commitment is reinforced by the primacy attached to the values of dignity and 
proportionality in contemporary European constitutionalism. The doctrinal 
frameworks developed in European constitutional law to consider the 
compatibility of sentencing practices with the values of human dignity and 
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proportionality offer a compelling alternative to the American jurisprudence of 
sentencing and punishment, with its focus on considering whether the minimal 
threshold of “cruel and unusual punishment” was violated and on the guarantee 
of due process.131 The established mechanisms built into inquisitorial procedural 
systems to review the decisions of trial courts and of prosecutors continue to 
enjoy the trust both of professional actors and of the public at large in 
European systems. In light of some troubling evidence provided by the recent 
American experience, the resistance of European policymakers to adopt these 
models of regulating sentencing discretion seems to be well grounded. 
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